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GENOCIDE IN DARFUR: INVESTIGATING ATROCITIES IN THE SUDAN, EDITED 
BY SAMUEL TOTTEN AND ERIC MARKUSEN, NEW YORK, ROUTLEDGE, 2006. 
284PP. PAPERBACK 
Reviewed by Rafiki UBALDO 
Genocide in Darfur provides a detailed discussion of the creation, purpose, 
methodology and findings of the Atrocities Documentation Team (ADT), a group of 
experts formed by the Coalition of International Justice (under the auspices of the US 
State Department) to conduct an investigation into the 2003-2004 crisis in Darfur for 
the express purpose of attempting to ascertain whether or not genocide had taken 
place there. The book also includes 'the views and analyses of different genocide 
scholars and specialists in international law vis-a-vis the findings and ramifications of 
the ADT. The editors of the book, Samuel Totten and Eric Markusen, were two of the 
24 investigators on the ADT. 
A territory as large as France, Darfur is located in the western part of Sudan. It shares 
borders with The Central African Republic, Chad and Libya. Administratively, it is 
divided into three parts: Western Darfur, South Darfur and North Darfur. Main towns in 
Darfur are AI Fashir, Geneina and Nyala. Largely populated by black Africans, Darfur 
is home to more than thirty ethnic groups but the largest are The Fur, The Massalit and 
the Zaghawa people. The Darfuri are Muslims who speak different African languages 
as well as Arabic. It is estimated that some 6.5 million people populate Darfur. In his 
chapter on the historical background of the conflict in Darfur ("Disaster in Darfur: 
Historical Overview''), Robert 0. Collins, a long time Sudanese specialist, reports th.at 
volatile and latent ethnic tensions are nothing new, but more recently they have 
become more violent and sustained as a result of long standing competition for 
pasture and agricultural land and water, which has been exacerbated by a terrible 
drought. Furthermore, he notes, the current government's plans to lslamize all Sudan . 
has intensified conflicts between different sections of the Sudanese societies within 
Darfur. Finally, the black Africans feel. that they have been purposely disenfranchised 
in just about every way possible: education, health, and justice. Fed up that their 
complaints were falling on deaf ears, segments of the black African people formed a 
rebel group (which subsequently split and then split again into what are now estimated 
to be some 30 rebel factions) and attacked Government of Sudan (GoS) military 
installations in early 2003. Instead of merely attacking and punishing the rebels, the 
government carried out a scorched earth policy in which its soldiers and the 
Janjaweed, its proxy militia, attacked all black Africans residing in Darfur. 
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To date, it is estimated that between 180,000 and over 400,000 black African lives 
have lost lives in Darfur due to the attacks of the GoS and Janjaweed. Approximately 
two million civilians have been displaced and now live in Internally Displaced People 
{IDP) camps around Darfur and over 250,000 refugees are stranded in Chad. There 
have been negotiations and peace agreements between the belligerents, but all sides 
in the conflict have broken these peace agreements almost as soon as they have been 
signed. 
In response to growing concerns that the Janjaweed and the Government of Sudan 
were involved in genocide in Darfur, the US State Department created the ADT in June 
2004. In their chapter "Creating the ADT: Turning a Good Idea into Reality," Nina 
Bang-Jensen and Stefanie Frease describe in detail the creation and the work of the 
ADT. They note that members of this team were carefully chosen on the basis of their 
experiences in investigating or prosecuting large-scale atrocities, expertise in regional 
affairs in Africa, and experiences in interviewing victims of trauma. While 24 individuals 
were selected to be investigators, the latter were supported by individuals from 
different organisations including those from the US State Department's, The Bureau of 
Intelligence and Research, and The American Bar Association's central European and 
Eurasian Law Initiative. The Coalition of International Justice headed up the entire 
project. 
Since the team could not travel within Darfur since it was not welcome on Sudanese 
territory, the team was sent to interview refugees in camps along the Chad/Sudan 
border. The team was in Chad between July and August 2004 and collected over 
1,100 interviews with victims of the Darfur conflict.1 The mission of the ADT was to 
conduct interviews in refugee camps along the Chad/Sudan border in order to 
understand the nature of crimes in Darfur and, as mentioned previously, determine 
whether or not these crimes could be described as genocide under the 1948 Genocide 
Convention. The findings of this team constituted the backbone of U.S Secretary of 
State Colin Powell's conclusion that genocide had taken place in Darfur. 2 
The data collected by the ADT were analyzed by both the US State Department and 
an outside body. Following a close analysis of the data, U.S. Secretary of State Colin 
Powell informed The US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, on September 9, 2004, 
that: "[ .. . ] We conclude, I conclude, that genocide has been committed in Darfur and 
1Nina Bang-Jensen, Stefanie Frease, 2006, Creating the ADT, in Totten, Samuel; Markusen, Eric (Eds), 
2006, Genocide in Darfur: Investigating Atrocities in the Sudan, Routledge, London, NewYork, pp. 45-57 
z See Totten and Markusen, 2006, Genocide in Darfur: Investigating Atrocities in the Sudan, Routledge. 
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that the government of Sudan and the Janjaweed 3 bear responsibility- and that 
genocide may still be occurring. "4. It was the first time that one sovereign nation 
officially and publicly accused another sovereign nation of genocide while the crisis 
was still active. (The entire testimony of Powell is fully reprinted in the appendices of 
this book). 
The George W. Bush administration based its genocide accusations on stark 
evidence. The findings of the ADT do not give room for doubt about the extent of the 
horror experienced by the Africans. As many of the authors note, the interviewees 
spoke about how they had witnessed "shooting, death from displacement, abduction, 
beating, rape, hearing racial epithets, villages destroyed, theft of livestock, aerial 
bombings, looting destruction of personal property", all at the hands of" the Janjaweed 
and the GoS (Government of Sudan) military."s Significantly, as Stephen A. Kostas 
stresses in his chapter, "Making the Determination of Genocide in Darfur," from the 
very beginning of the creation of the ADT and throughout the investigation and 
analyses of the data, Richard Prosper, former US Ambassador-at-Large for War 
Crimes, and Lorne Craner, Former Assistant Secretary for the State Department's 
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour, worked hard to make sure the 
entire process was as "dispassionate and clinical" in order to ensure that the U.S. 
government would ultimately make "a pure decision, a clean legal analysis free of 
policy considerations."6 
Powell's accusation of genocide was not entirely new in Washington as on June 22, 
2004, the US House of Representatives had unanimously declared that genocide was 
being perpetrated in Darfur and had urged the US admin istration to do all it possibly 
could to intervene and stop the killings .? (The House of Representatives, though, had 
not based their assertion on research conducted by the U.S. government.) Powell's 
statement that genocide has been committed in Darfur did not fall in line with the 
recommendation made by The House; rather, during the course of his testimony he 
said: "No new action is dictated by this determination p.e genocide]. We have been 
3 Colloquially, according to the black Africans of Darfur, Janjaweed "means, variously, "hordes," 
"ruffians," and "men or devils on horseback." 
4 See Colin L. Powell, September 9, 2004, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
Appendix 3 in Totten, Samuel; Markusen, Eric (Eds) Genocide in Darfur: Investigating Atrocities in the 
Sudan, Routledge, London, NewYork, p. 265. 
5 Samuel Totten, ibid. pp. 200-201 
s Stephen A.Kostas, ibid., p. 120 
7 See the Chronology of the Darfur Crisis in Totten, Samuel; Markusen, Eric (Eds), 2006, Genocide in 
Darfur: Investigating Atrocities in the Sudan, Routledge, London, NewYork, xxvii 
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doing everything we can do to get the Sudanese government to act responsibly. "B 
Ultimately, the ADT's findings were contradicted by the International Commission of 
Inquiry (COl) in Darfur's final statement that the government of Sudan was not 
pursuing a policy of genocide. The COl was created as a result of UN Security Council 
Resolution 1564 of the United Nations' (UN) Security Council (after the U.S. 
Government referred the matter of Darfur to the United Nations) and had the mission 
to establish whether or not the government of Sudan was committing genocide in 
Darfur. In its report. released on January 25, 2005, the COl states that "serious 
violations of international law have occurred in Darfur, including crimes against 
humanity".9 The report came to confirm what Kofi Annan, the then Secretary General 
of The UN, told the Security Council on November 4, 2004, that "war crimes and 
crimes against humanity have occurred on a large and systematic scale in Darfur."10 
Totten's second chapter in the book, "The U.S. Investigation into the Darfur Crisis and 
Its Determination of Genocide: A Critical Analysis," provides a scathing review of the 
sloppiness of the COl investigation and questions the validity of its finding of no 
genocide. 
In June 2005, The International Criminal Court (ICC) began its own investigations into 
the crimes committed in Darfur. By then, the UN Security Council had imposed 
sanctions on four Sudanese accused of having committed abuses in Darfur.11 
In part, at least, it seems that the US move to label the Darfur conflict as genocide was 
motivated by the experiences of the horrors of Rwanda in 1994 and Srebrenica in 
1995 and the inaction that ensued from the part of the international community. During 
the genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda and the slaughter of Muslim men in 
Srebrenica, different leaders in the world (most prominently, the U.S. Presidential 
Administration of Bill Clinton) deliberately refused to use the word genocide while 
killings were ongoing, and, in turn, assiduously avoided sending troops to save lives. 
And as Stephen Kostas puts it, the Clinton inaction in Yugoslavia and especially in 
Rwanda was openly criticized and pressure came from people of different walks of life 
s See Colin I. Powell, ibid., pp. 266-267 
9See the Chronology of the Darfur Crisis in Totten, Samuel; Markusen, Eric (Eds), 2006, Genocide in 
Darfur: Investigating Atrocities in the Sudan, Routledge, London, NewYork, pp. xxxiv 
1o ibid., xxxiii 
11 ibid. , xxxviii 
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not to make such mistakes again.12 Determination of genocide in the Rwandan case 
was a dilemma for the Clinton administration because officials thought they were 
obliged to act if they used the term "genocide" to describe it. Gerald Caplan's reflection 
("From Rwanda to Darfur: Lessons Learned?") is another chapter in this book that 
vividly reminds us of the inaction of the international community when genocide 
against the Tutsi was being committed in Rwanda. 
The explanations behind the real motives of non-intervention in Darfur remain highly 
speculative among experts. As Gregory Stanton notes in his chapter "Proving 
Genocide in Darfur," "The Genocide Convention carries no such legal compulsion to 
act. It legally requires only states-parties to the convention to pass national laws 
against genocide and prosecute or extradite those who commit the crime."13 Stanton 
observes that Article VIII of the Convention vaguely advocates that states-parties may 
call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take action under the Charter 
of the United Nations to prevent and suppress of acts of genocide.14 As for Article I of 
the Convention on Genocide, it calls for a moral obligation to prevent genocide, but it 
does not dictate military intervention or any other particular measure. 
Stanton argues that UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide 
also fit the elements of crimes defined by the Statute of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC), clarifying that genocide must be the result of a policy systematically 
organised or guided by direct orders. Stanton goes on to say that evidence collected 
by the ADT point to the fact that the ai-Bashir government has, through its innumerable 
bombings of villages of black Africans and the ongoing attacks with the Janjaweed, 
commissioned by the government, carried out such crimes in a systematic fashion as a 
result of a direct policy. The killings were not only intentional they were selective as 
well, since Arab villages in Darfur have been left untouched by the attacks. Thus, due 
to these examples and others, Stanton concludes that "the intentional destruction, in 
whole or in part, of a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such" is exactly 
what is happening in Darfur.15 
In "The US Investigation into the Darfur Crisis and its Determination of Genocide: A 
Critical Analysis," Samuel Totten notes that some scholars have questioned the 
12 Stephen A.Kostas, 2006, Making the determination of genocide in Darfur, in Totten, Samuel; 
Markusen, Eric (Eds), 2006, Genocide in Darfur: Investigating Atrocities in the Sudan, Routledge, 
London, NewYork, p. 111 
13See Gregory H. Stanton, ibid., p.185 
14 ibid. p.185 
1ssee Gregory H.Stanton, ibid., p. 182 
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motives behind the determination of genocide by the US Government and the validity 
of the determination without necessarily refuting the veracity of Darfuri plight as 
contained in ADT Report.16 In that regard, Alex de Waal, director of Justice Africa and 
an expert on The Sudan, not only criticizes the genocide determination but the motives 
behind the creation of the ADT, but not the content of the ADT report. Samuel Totten 
quotes him as saying that the determination of genocide is "a cynical addition of 
"genocide" to America's armoury of hegemonic interventionism" and that "the genocide 
finding is accurate to the letter of the law, but it is no help to understanding what is 
happening in Darfur, or to finding a solution."17 Totten, while reflecting on de Waal's 
criticism, notes that De Waal, in fact, admits that genocide was the right call, and that 
over and above that just how did De Waal know that the finding of genocide might not 
lead to a solution? In fact, Totten notes, "the findings of the ADT led the United States 
to refer the matter to the UN, and the UN, following its investigation, referred the 
matter to the International Criminal Court (ICC). As a result of the latter, the ICC is now 
conducting an investigation into the. atrocities in Darfur for the express purpose of 
bringing suspected perpetrators to trial." 1s (It is worth noting that after years of 
conducting its own investigation into the Darfur crisis, the ICC issued charges of war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide against President Omar ai-Bashir.) 
US Secretary of State, Colin Powell's comments about the US Government's 
responsibility (e.g., that determination of genocide does not dictate any other action, 
such as intervention to halt the genocide) vis-a-vis a finding of genocide suggests that 
he and his colleagues at the U.S. State Department carefully studied the legal 
responsibilities inherent in such a finding, and made it knowing that the U.S. would 
need not do anymore than refer the matter to the UN. More specifically, during the 
discussions, debates and analysis of the situation and ADT findings, it seems obvious 
that the U.S. State Department clearly came to understand that no nation is legally 
bound, as a signatory to the UN Convention on Genocide, to intervene to halt a 
genocide. It is this matter that constitutes one of the major contributions of this book to 
the ongoing debates about genocide prevention. It is also this discovery, and 
subsequent stance by the U.S. government, that, despite its declaration of good 
intentions, the U.S. has been accused of ignoring the suffering of Darfuris. Some have 
argued that its lack of action to halt the genocide was due, in part, to the U.S. desire to 
1ssee Samuel Totten, ibid. , p. 206 
171bid., p. 207 
1a ibid. P. 208 
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maintain good relations with the Khartoum government, a good American partner in 
the war on terror.19 
The picture is not altogether sombre though: the creation, implementation and the 
findings of the ADT and its analysis in this book illustrate the existence of tools that 
governmental and non-governmental forces can muster to at least send early warnings 
and to investigate genocide. The ADT exemplifies possibilities as to how governments 
and civil society can effectively work together to investigate, denounce, and, hopefully 
and ideally, eventually prevent genocide. Finally, as Totten accurately puts it, "a 
precedent has been set in which one sovereign nation (the United States) has accused 
another sovereign nation (Sudan) of having committed genocide while the atrocities 
were still going on. This, and itself, was a historic occasion. The determination broke, if 
you will, a certain 'barrier' of individual nations not making such an accusation when 
they were not only justified doing so, but had a moral obligation, if signatories to the 
UNCG, to do so."20 
19Gerald Caplan, 2006, From Rwanda to Darfur: Lessons learned? in Totten, Samuel; Markusen, Eric 
(Eds), 2006, Genocide in Darfur: Investigating Atrocities in the Sudan, Routledge, London, NewYork, p. 
178 
-·20 Samuel Totten, ibid. p. 218 
103 
Ubaldo: Genocide in Darfur: Investigating Atrocities in the Sudan. Edited
Published by Scholar Commons, 2009
